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IN RE COOK AND THE FRANKLIN 
PROCEEDING: NEW DOOR, SAME 
DILAPIDATED HOUSE 
Christopher Hawthorne* & Marisa Sacks** 
          The California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Cook was 
supposed to bring about a sea change in the way trial courts conduct 
Franklin mitigation hearings for youthful offenders. In fact, while Cook 
changed the procedure for initiating a post-conviction Franklin 
proceeding, little else has changed, including the lack of agreement 
among attorneys concerning best practices in these proceedings, and a 
less than less-than-enthusiastic response from the criminal defense bar. 
Absent any guidance from higher courts, the Franklin proceeding is 
limited by the personal and institutional energies and preferences of 
judges, prosecutors, public defenders and private defense counsel. The 
authors of this Article, who run a law school clinic dedicated to juvenile 
post-conviction mitigation, believe that the implementation of Franklin 
and Cook has not been as robust as needed, and that a more assertive, 
nuanced, and in-depth set of practices are necessary. This Article 
explores the underpinnings of the Franklin proceeding, the inadequacies 
of the institutional response so far, the need and purpose for a more 
robust set of practices related to Franklin, and recommendations for the 
practices themselves.  
  
 
 * Christopher Hawthorne, Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Juvenile Innocence & 
Fair Sentencing Clinic, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. 
 **  Marisa Sacks, Staff Attorney, Juvenile Innocence & Fair Sentencing Clinic, Loyola Law 
School, Los Angeles. The authors would like to extend a special thanks to Kayla Burchuk for 
suggesting this Article, and an equally special thanks to the students of the Juvenile Innocence & 
Fair Sentencing Clinic, who fight every day to tell their clients’ mitigation stories in California 
courts and prisons. 
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The California Supreme Court’s June 3, 2019, decision in In re 
Cook1 was much anticipated by both the criminal defense and 
prosecutorial bars.2 At issue was the fate of nearly 20,000 youthful 
offenders serving long sentences in California prisons.3 Their 
convictions had been final for some time. Could they use the writ of 
habeas corpus to present mitigation evidence relevant to their long-
final convictions—evidence that should have been presented at their 
original sentencing hearings, as much as thirty years earlier?4 
These difficult questions derived from the nature of the Franklin 
remedy itself, which at first glance is an odd, seemingly toothless 
transmutation of a traditional sentencing hearing. When done 
 
 1. 441 P.3d 912 (Cal. 2019). 
 2. Anthony Maurice Cook was tried in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County for a 
December 1, 2003, drive-by shooting. He was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of 
attempted murder, with firearm enhancements and was sentenced to 125 years to life, despite 
having been seventeen years old at the time of the crimes. Cook petitioned for a writ of habeas 
corpus in San Bernardino superior court, challenging his functional life without parole sentence 
under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). After a summary denial, Cook refiled his petition 
in the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three. The court of appeal denied Cook’s petition, 
holding that California Penal Code section 3051, following Montgomery v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 
916 (1984), cured the Eighth Amendment violation in his sentence, and that, therefore, he was not 
entitled to habeas relief. In re Cook, No. G050907, 2016 WL 1384894 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 
2016). Cook sought review in the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court granted 
Cook’s petition for review and transferred the matter back to the court of appeal on July 13, 2016, 
“with directions to vacate its decision and consider whether petitioner is entitled to make a record 
before the superior court of “mitigating evidence tied to his youth” in light of People v. Franklin.” 
Docket for Cal. Supreme Court Case S234512, available at 
https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=2141326&doc_n
o=S234512&request_token=NiIwLSEmXkw8WzBRSyNNWENIIFQ0UDxTICNeUztTUCAgCg
%3D%3D. On remand, the court of appeal determined that: (1) Cook was entitled to trial court 
proceeding for making record of mitigating evidence tied to his youth; and (2) the proper vehicle 
for seeking such a remedy was a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In re Cook, 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
646 (Ct. App. 2017). The attorney general petitioned for review, which was granted on April 12, 
2017. In re Cook, 441 P.3d at 912, 914. From April 12, 2017 until June 3, 2019, the question of 
whether habeas corpus was the proper remedy for a Franklin proceeding lingered in California 
courts, with some courts granting petitions (for example, in Los Angeles County), others denying 
them, and still others staying the petitions. 
 3. The numbers are in dispute, but a December 2017 comprehensive spreadsheet of 
California youthful offender parole hearing (YOPH) eligible inmates listed 19,290 individual 
names. The actual number may be much higher. Of these nearly 20,000 inmates, approximately 
6,500 were convicted for crimes committed while they were minors. See Excel Document, Cal. Bd. 
of Parole Hearings, Eligible Youthful Offenders with YPED’s [Youth Parole Eligibility Dates], 
Monday, December 18, 2017 (on file with authors); see also Beth Caldwell, Creating Meaningful 
Opportunities for Release: Graham, Miller and California’s Youthful Offender Parole Hearings, 
40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 265–66 (2016) (“Whereas there are approximately 2,623 
juvenile offenders serving life sentences in California, an estimated 6,500 California people in 
California prisons qualify for YOPHs under S.B. 260,” speaking of youthful offenders under the 
age of 18). 
 4. In re Cook, 441 P.3d at 914–15. 
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properly, a Franklin proceeding looks like a death penalty mitigation 
hearing: a detailed report by a mitigation expert, an equally detailed 
report by a psychological professional, an extensive memorandum in 
mitigation, followed by a live hearing with witnesses and cross-
examination, with the People also presenting evidence. The 
difference—and it is quite a difference—is that the Franklin hearing, 
in contrast to Miller hearings, California Penal Code section 
1170(d)(2) hearings, or even juvenile court transfer hearings, has no 
judicial resolution: no change in sentence; no on-the-record findings; 
no grant or denial of relief; not even a stray judicial remark concerning 
the defendant’s character, rehabilitation, or prospects. By taking Cook 
up on review, the California Supreme Court had the opportunity to 
further classify to which phylum this judicial mutant belonged.5 The 
result would affect every institutional actor in the state criminal justice 
system. 
If the court affirmed the survival of a post-conviction remedy 
under People v. Franklin,6 prosecutors predicted a flood of mitigation 
hearings, overwhelming trial courts with social and psychological 
evidence that would not change the defendant’s sentence or parole 
eligibility date by one day. Defense attorneys, on the other hand, were 
concerned that inmates who were sentenced pre-Franklin and 
therefore deprived of a mitigation hearing would be at a stark 
disadvantage, compared to defendants sentenced after Franklin.7 
 
 5. The authors are aware that they are mixing metaphors by classifying Franklin as both a 
house and a creature. On the other hand, there are creatures who are also houses, such as the hermit 
crab (genus Paguroidea), which uses another creature’s shell as a house, as well as a part of its 
person. In fact, Franklin has a very hermit crab-like existence, since it repurposes the disused shell 
of a sentencing hearing to guarantee its own survival. 
 6. 370 P.3d 1053 (Cal. 2016). 
 7. Of course, ideally a youthful offender should exercise the right to present mitigation 
evidence when it has a substantive effect on the offender’s sentence: either in a transfer hearing 
from juvenile court (where applicable), pursuant to California Welfare & Institutions Code section 
707 (a), or in a sentencing hearing in adult court, post-trial. 
  On the other hand, some intermediate appellate courts appear to consider youthful 
offenders sentenced post-Franklin in exactly the same position as youthful offenders sentenced pre-
Franklin. In People v. Medrano, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 (Ct. App. 2019), the Fourth District Court 
of Appeal, Division Two, declared that the defendant, Michael Medrano—sentenced eighteen 
months after Franklin was decided—had forfeited his right to present “mitigating youth-related 
evidence” at his sentencing hearing, “whether by choice or inadvertence.” Id. at 658. All was not 
lost, however: Medrano still had the right to “fil[e] a motion ‘for a Franklin proceeding under the 
authority of section 1203.01.’” Id. To Medrano, on the other hand, a lot had been lost: specifically, 
the right to have the trial court consider mitigating youth-related evidence and then resentence him. 
The reasoning in Medrano was apparently so compelling that the First District Court of Appeal 
reversed itself. People v. Carranza, No. A152211, 2019 WL 5867435 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2019), 
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Ultimately, Cook resolved none of those issues, except one: 
youthful offenders with final judgments—that is, youthful offenders 
who have no more direct appeal rights—can still seek relief under 
Franklin. The presentation of mitigation evidence will not change the 
offenders’ sentences, but it will provide information relevant to their 
future parole hearings. The filing to start the process will no longer be 
a petition; it will now be a motion pursuant to California Penal Code 
section 1203.01, connected to a theoretical case that will assume 
corporeal form once the motion is filed and accepted by the court.8 
Finally, the process will no longer be called a Franklin hearing; it will 
be a Franklin “proceeding,” reflecting the fact that the judge makes no 
ruling at the end of the process.9 The court—perhaps reflecting the 
 
vacating 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 919 (Ct. App. 2019). Like Medrano, Daniel Carranza (or rather, his 
attorney) had failed to introduce youth-related mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing, even 
though he was sentenced after Franklin was decided. On appeal, Carranza argued that he was 
“entitled to a limited remand to ‘make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth 
offender parole hearing.’” Id. at 924 (citing Franklin, 370 P.3d at 1065). 
  The court agreed, stating that, “normally, a defendant prejudiced by counsel’s inaction in 
the trial court may rely on the ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) framework to vindicate his 
or her rights.” Id. at 926. However, because the Cook court had imposed “[r]estrictions on the use 
of that doctrine in the Franklin context,” in part by declaring that the writ of habeas corpus was no 
longer the appropriate vehicle for Franklin, “it [was] questionable whether an IAC claim remains 
a viable method by which an offender can obtain access to a Franklin proceeding where his or her 
counsel failed to request a Franklin proceeding.” Id. at 927. Accordingly, the court held that 
Carranza had not forfeited his right to a Franklin proceeding; it was too important a right. Id. at 
929. 
  Barely a month later, however, the First District Court of Appeal vacated its published 
decision in Carranza, and issued an unpublished decision, agreeing with Medrano. The court, 
adopting reasoning that was diametrically opposed to its earlier reasoning, declared that Carranza 
had forfeited his right to a Franklin proceeding during sentencing—but he could still “seek such a 
proceeding under section 1203.01.” Carranza, 2019 WL 5867435, at *7. Apparently, the Franklin 
remedy was not an important enough right to survive the forfeiture analysis under People v. Scott, 
885 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Cal. 1994), but the right survived anyway, only under section 1203.01. 
Moreover, it does not appear that Carranza would have been resentenced, even if his case had been 
remanded. 
  Therefore, while Medrano does not necessarily bestow an undying right to a Franklin 
proceeding pursuant to section 1203.01, it does suggest that the remedy is fairly durable, even for 
those defendants who should have sought to present youth-related mitigation evidence at their 
original, post-Franklin sentencing hearings. 
 8. In re Cook, 441 P.3d at 922 (“[T]he proper avenue is to file a motion in superior court 
under the original caption and case number, citing the authority of [California Penal Code] section 
1203.01 and today’s decision.”). 
 9. Id. at 916 n.3 (“Franklin processes are more properly called ‘proceedings’ rather than 
‘hearings.’ A hearing generally involves definitive issues of law or fact to be determined with a 
decision rendered based on that determination. A proceeding is a broader term describing the form 
or manner of conducting judicial business before a court. While a judicial officer presides over 
a Franklin proceeding and regulates its conduct, the officer is not called upon to make findings of 
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practice in San Bernardino County, where Cook originated—declared 
that documentary submissions, not hearings, may be acceptable.10 
Otherwise, very little has changed. To poach on the metaphor in the 
title, the doorway to the house has been remodeled by a contractor 
somewhat more concerned with cost than architectural integrity. Once 
inside the house, the buyer—the inmate seeking Franklin relief, who 
must live with the results—will find the interior unchanged but will 
still find plenty to criticize in the details. 
Specifically, the California Supreme Court’s opinion admits that 
post-conviction Franklin still exists, but it does not say whether the 
remedy is essential. In fact, it leaves that deeper question 
conspicuously unanswered. This is not surprising; after all, the 
California Supreme Court created the Franklin hearing in a few 
paragraphs at the tail end of a largely negative opinion, one that spent 
most of its length explaining why the defendant, Tyris Lamar Franklin, 
could not get a resentencing hearing pursuant to Miller. Could 20,000 
mitigation hearings hang on such a slender thread? 
Through its light-handed treatment of Franklin trial procedure, 
was the California Supreme Court signaling that it really didn’t care 
about this remedy? Or was the court, through its gnomic remarks about 
judicial discretion, actually telling courts that the remedy—still in its 
infancy—requires deeper and more detailed examination, not by the 
California Supreme Court, but by the lower courts and attorneys 
tasked with carrying it out?11 
 
fact or render any final determination at the proceeding’s conclusion. Parole determination are left 
to the Board.” (citations omitted)). 
 10. Id. at 916. 
 11. It is also possible that the court had been reading John F. Pfaff’s groundbreaking book, 
Locked In. See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND 
HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017). Pfaff, a Professor at Fordham Law School, makes a 
number of innovative and useful points about mass incarceration, which contrast with what he calls 
“The Standard Story.” Id. at 21–123 (arguing that “The Standard Story,” particularly as constructed 
by Michelle Alexander, MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012), focuses mistakenly on low-level drug offenses and the 
federal criminal justice system as the drivers of mass incarceration). One point Pfaff makes 
repeatedly is that felony prosecutions that result in prison sentences represent a massive transfer of 
fiscal liability from the county (which pays for judges, prosecutors and trials) to the state (which 
pays for prisons and parole hearings). PFAFF, supra, at 142–143. He goes on to suggest one 
motivation for California’s Public Safety Realignment Act of 2011, which mandated that counties, 
not the state, shoulder the responsibility for incarcerating low-level offenders. Id. at 150–151. 
  “Lifers,” (those serving life sentences) however, were still the financial responsibility of 
state prisons, not county jails. However, in People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012), and 
People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245 (Cal. 2014), the California Supreme Court crafted a judicial 
remedy for juveniles who had committed violent offenses, putting the financial and political burden 
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One stubborn fact remains: The court did create the Franklin 
proceeding, when it could have simply denied relief. Moreover, the 
court did not simply call upon the legislature to enact more robust 
mitigation investigation during the parole process; it ordered trial 
courts to hold hearings, appoint attorneys and experts, and submit the 
resultant evidence package to the Board of Parole Hearings. Then, 
three years later, the court reaffirmed the existence of the remedy, 
whether we call it a “Franklin hearing” or an “evidence preservation 
proceeding.” 
If mitigation evidence is to be presented at such a proceeding, that 
evidence must have value, at least to the Board of Parole Hearings. 
But the selection of venue is also significant. If the evidence has no 
value to the trial court, why present it there? This strongly suggests 
that the Franklin proceeding is not about parole; it’s about sentencing. 
Specifically, the proceeding exists to change the conversation about 
the oversentencing of youth, one case and one defendant at a time. 
Through repetition, context, and the repetition of context, the Franklin 
hearing is aimed squarely at the institutional actors who committed 
thousands of youthful offenders to California prisons. The fact that 
Franklin is a soft revolution does not make it less of a revolution. 
Therefore, defense attorneys and willing clients need to keep 
demanding investigation, expert appointments, and hearings, so that 
they can continue to create the mitigation context for future sentencing 
hearings. 
This Article will trace the contours of the court’s ostensible 
holdings in Franklin and Cook, while also attempting to answer the 
deeper question about the future of the remedy. First, this Article will 
 
of remedying mass incarceration on county courts and prosecutors. In response, the legislature—
partly under pressure from the California District Attorneys Association—created the Youthful 
Offender Parole Hearing, returning the burden to state prisons and parole boards to decide which 
youthful offenders needed to be released. Franklin returned some of that burden to counties, by 
requiring attorneys and courts to develop mitigation evidence that would eventually be used by the 
state Board of Parole Hearings. As argued below, Cook appears to attenuate the Franklin remedy, 
and its language suggests that part of the motivation for that attenuation is to ease the burden on 
county courts, allowing them to simply accept submissions of documents, in lieu of actual hearings. 
See in re Cook, 441 P.3d 912, 922 (Cal. 2019) (citing Franklin, 370 P.3d at 1065) (“[In managing 
a Franklin proceeding, t]he court may, for example, require an offer of proof regarding the evidence 
the offender seeks to present, so that it can determine whether such evidence is relevant to youth-
related factors and meaningfully adds to the already available record. It may also determine whether 
testimony is ‘appropriate’, or if other types of evidentiary submissions will suffice.” (citation 
omitted)). As discussed in more detail below, in the opinion of these authors, evidentiary 
submissions rarely suffice. 
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trace California’s journey to the holding in Cook. Specifically, it will 
analyze how the triangulation of watershed California Supreme Court 
precedent, the state’s rapidly changing legislative landscape, and 
revelatory legal attitudes toward both the justice system and prison 
overcrowding led to the Franklin and Cook decisions. Next, this 
Article will address the seemingly shared attitudes of many defense 
attorneys and prosecutors that the Franklin remedy is basically 
administrative and has very little (if any) bearing on legal (or even 
moral) outcomes. In doing so, the authors also hope to explain the 
historical policies and practices that gave rise to these persistent 
attitudes, and why they need to change. Last, this Article will detail 
what the authors believe to be best practices for litigating the Franklin 
remedy from beginning to end. 
THE JOURNEY TO COOK 
At issue in Cook was a basic question: does a youthful offender 
have a post-conviction right to a Franklin proceeding? And along with 
it, a more procedural question: was the writ of habeas corpus the 
proper vehicle to pursue such a right? To understand why these 
questions are being asked at all, it is necessary to examine two seminal 
cases: Miller v. Alabama12 and Brown v. Plata.13 
MILLER V. ALABAMA 
Miller v. Alabama, decided by the United States Supreme Court 
in 2012, was both a culmination of years of advocacy and the 
foundation for every juvenile justice reform that came after it. While 
Miller now seems like a treasure house of policy, rules, and helpful 
quotations, the opinion itself was narrow, elliptical, and politically 
astute. Justice Elena Kagan, less than two years into her tenure as a 
Justice, wrote the opinion, which steered a careful middle course 
between two extremes: on one hand, banning juvenile life without the 
possibility of parole (LWOP) outright, or on the other, declaring 
juvenile LWOP constitutional and leaving any further reforms to the 
states. 
Instead, Justice Kagan declared only that mandatory LWOP for 
juveniles was unconstitutional. The holding left judges free to 
 
 12. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 13. 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
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sentence juveniles to LWOP, but abrogated state statutes that 
mandated LWOP as the only penalty for a juvenile convicted of 
serious crimes. Certain states—“mandatory” states, such as Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, Louisiana and Alabama—would have to amend their 
juvenile LWOP statutes.14 In a 5-4 decision, Justice Kagan was joined 
in the majority by Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and 
Sotomayor. Justice Breyer filed a concurrence, in which Justice 
Sotomayor joined. Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas filed 
various dissenting opinions. 
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court relied on two lines of 
precedent. First, it reaffirmed its long-standing commitment to 
considering the status of children when construing their rights under 
the Constitution, asserting that “children are constitutionally different 
from adults for purposes of sentencing” and thus “less deserving of the 
most severe punishments.”15 
The second line of precedent was grounded in the growing 
scientific consensus that, regardless of their crimes, children are less 
culpable and have greater prospects for reform because of their 
“hallmark features.”16 Specifically, children are less mature and thus 
prone to “recklessness, impulsivity and heedless risk-taking.”17 
Children “are more vulnerable to . . . negative influences and outside 
pressures.”18 And finally, children are “less fixed” in their character 
and consequently more capable of change than adults.19 These 
“distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications 
for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders.”20 
Therefore, “imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile 
offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.”21 
 
 14. See Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 482, 486 & nn.13–15 (noting that twenty-nine jurisdictions had 
mandatory LWOP statutes for juveniles, including: Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, 
Virginia, Washington, and the federal government). 
 15. Id. at 471 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)). 
 16. Id. at 471, 477. 
 17. Id. at 461 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2004)). 
 18. Id. at 471 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). 
 19. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 
89 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570). 
 20. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472. 
 21. Id. at 479; see generally Brief for the American Psychological Association, American 
Psychiatric Association, and National Association of Social Workers as Amici Curiae in Support 
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As is often the case, the good stuff was in the details. Justice 
Kagan did not simply make a broad statutory declaration; she made a 
test—albeit a test couched in negative, precatory language—that 
would require skilled advocacy to achieve any real meaning. In 
discussing why mandatory juvenile LWOP violated the individualized 
sentencing requirement of Roper v. Simmons22 and Graham v. 
Florida,23 she noted that, with a mandatory LWOP sentence, all 
children would be treated the same: as irredeemable.24 To avoid this 
unconstitutional result, she suggested that a court could consider 
certain factors that would allow it to sort out juveniles who were 
“irreparably corrupt” from those who only appeared to be corrupt, 
because of their transient, adolescent qualities.25 This apparent 
corruption in youth manifests for a variety of reasons: because of 
childhood trauma, mental illness, peer threats, and most importantly, 
the immaturity that makes so many children appear to be callous, 
inappropriate, and even monstrous.26 
But this list of subject areas—which has since become reified into 
“the Miller factors”—was not the most important policy statement in 
a case full of policy statements. Most important for juvenile justice 
reform was a cautionary phrase at the end of the opinion: “[G]iven all 
we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children’s 
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think 
appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible 
penalty will be uncommon.”27 
 
of Petitioners at 4, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (noting that “[i]t is increasingly clear 
that adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions and systems related to higher-order 
executive functions such as impulse control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance”); Graham, 560 
U.S. at 82 (“The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile 
offender who did not commit homicide.”); Roper, 543 U.S at 578 (“The Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 
when their crimes were committed.”). 
 22. 543 U.S. 551 (2004). 
 23. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 24. Miller, 567 U.S. at 478. 
 25. See id. at 477. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. at 479 (emphasis added). This phrase—declaring that juvenile LWOP should be 
“uncommon”—is straight out of death penalty jurisprudence, as is much of the reasoning in Roper, 
Graham, and Miller. These similarities are outside the scope of this Article, but the idea that 
extreme sentences ought to be “rare” or “uncommon”—and that the determination of who receives 
these “rare” penalties starts with Justice Byron White’s concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, decided 
not long after the reinstatement of the death penalty, following a nationwide moratorium. Justice 
White, understandably, was concerned that the death penalty was being imposed arbitrarily on 
defendants, without consideration for the comparative gravity of the crime involved, or the 
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The call for juvenile LWOP to be “uncommon” changed Miller 
from a mere technical opinion to a call to arms. Changing juvenile 
LWOP from mandatory to discretionary was an order that could be 
fulfilled in a single legislative session, making sure it was rare would 
require years of litigation, client by client, case by case. It would need 
an army of lawyers, all pushing in the same direction. 
CALIFORNIA’S RESPONSE TO MILLER 
Many of those lawyers would be in California. A 2010 study by 
the National Conference of State Legislatures found that, in raw 
numbers, California had the fifth highest juvenile LWOP prison 
population in the United States, with 250 juveniles serving the 
sentence.28 Other studies placed the number over 300.29 Although this 
high number is to some degree a function of California’s large 
population, other big states did not find it necessary to lock up children 
for the rest of their lives. Texas, despite its enthusiasm for the adult 
death penalty, did not have a similar zest for juvenile LWOP. The 
study noted above found that, in 2010, Texas had only five juvenile 
offenders serving life without the possibility of parole.30 
California, however, did not confine itself to sentencing juveniles 
to “actual LWOP.” Because of California’s peculiar constellation of 
sentencing laws, the state had an even bigger problem than juvenile 
LWOP: “functional juvenile LWOP.” A “functional LWOP” sentence 
is one where the offender theoretically is eligible for parole, but where 
the offender’s minimum eligible parole date occurs outside of the 
 
individual characteristics of the offender. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious 
crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed 
from the many cases in which it is not.”). Those themes—that the death penalty be imposed with 
“great infrequency” and the necessity of “distinguishing [those] few cases” from far more common 
non-death cases are echoed in the Miller Court’s clear directives to lower courts: “[W]e think 
appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty [i.e., LWOP] will 
be uncommon,” and “[W]e require [the sentencing court] to take into account how children are 
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in 
prison.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80. 
 28. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 
(JLWOP) 1–17 (2010), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jlwopchart.pdf. The other states with 
large juvenile LWOP populations are Florida (266), Illinois (103), Louisiana (335), Michigan 
(346), Missouri (116), and Pennsylvania (444). Id. at 4–9, 12. 
 29. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHEN I DIE . . . THEY’LL SEND ME HOME 1 (2012), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/crd0112webwcover.pdf (citing 301 juvenile 
offenders serving LWOP in California prisons as of 2012). 
 30. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 28, at 14. 
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offender’s expected natural lifespan.31 The California Supreme Court 
has never defined what the minimum age of parole eligibility must be 
for a juvenile to have functional LWOP, but in People v. Contreras,32 
the court emphatically stated that fifty years to life is functional 
LWOP, though shorter sentences may also qualify.33 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss all the reasons that 
California sentences so many juveniles to very long sentences. 
However, a relatively cursory review of California sentencing laws 
from the 1990s to the present day should give a sense of how harsh 
sentencing laws (often passed by initiative) and the hallmark qualities 
of youth combine to put many children in prison for the rest of their 
lives. 
First, starting in the late 1970s, California passed a series of crime 
bills, usually with pithy names: “The Death Penalty Act” (1978); “The 
Victim’s Bill of Rights” (1982); “The STEP [Street Terrorism 
Enforcement and Prevention] Act” (1988); “The Crime Victims 
Justice Reform Act” (1990); “Three Strikes and You’re Out” (1994); 
the “Juvenile Crime Initiative” (2000); and “Marsy’s Law” (2008). 
While the intent of each of these bills or initiatives was to strengthen 
the hand of law enforcement and prosecutors, lengthen sentences for 
individual crimes or activities, enhance the rights of crime victims and 
their families, and trim away the rights of criminal defendants, the 
combined effect of each law was magnified by the others.34 
So, it may seem reasonable that an offender who attempts to 
murder another human being should receive a sentence of life in 
prison, with a minimum sentence of seven, ten, or even fifteen years. 
It may also be reasonable that an offender who uses a firearm should 
receive an enhanced sentence. It is arguable that persons who 
discharge weapons from or into motor vehicles, who shoot at groups 
of people, or who participate in a violent crime that results in the death 
 
 31. In People v. Caballero, the California Supreme Court found that Rodrigo Caballero’s 
sentence of 110 years to life was the “functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence,” and 
that, therefore, he “would have no opportunity to ‘demonstrate growth and maturity’ to try to secure 
his release.” People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012). The court did not, however, 
declare what was the bottom limit of “functional LWOP.” Id.  
 32. 411 P.3d 445 (Cal. 2018). 
 33. Id. at 455. 
 34. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; see also CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION 
GUIDE FOR 1994, GENERAL ELECTION 32–37 (1994), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=2090&context=ca_ballot_props. 
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of the victim of that crime should also be punished more severely.35 It 
may also deter youths from joining street gangs if they know that, 
when they commit a crime along with fellow gang members, they may 
all receive an enhanced sentence.36 
What is far less reasonable is that none of these harsher 
sentencing provisions were ever harmonized with the others. Many 
sentences and enhancements were “mandatory consecutive” 
sentences, meaning that, although a defendant might fire a single 
bullet at a group of people and hit no one, every person in that group 
was a potential victim, and every victim required the defendant to 
serve a separate sentence, one after the other, usually until the offender 
was old, dying, or dead.37 
Old, dying, or dead, even if he was seventeen years old at the time 
of the crime. Because, make no mistake, juvenile offenders were the 
 
 35. These situations are reflected in California Penal Code section 190.2, as “special 
circumstances,” which justify the imposition of the death penalty for adults, or the use of LWOP 
for juveniles. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (listing “special circumstances” that apply 
to homicides committed by shooting from a motor vehicle (section 190.2(a)(21)), involving 
multiple victims (section 190.2(a)(2)), or while engaged in certain enumerated felonies 
(section 190.2(a)(17))). 
 36. See id. § 190.2(a)(22) (allowing imposition of the death penalty or LWOP, if a homicide 
is “carried out to further the activities of [a] criminal street gang”). Discouraging gang membership 
was an essential part of the STEP Act, as the legislative findings indicate: “It is the intent of the 
Legislature in enacting this chapter to seek the eradication of criminal activity by street gangs by 
focusing upon patterns of criminal gang activity and upon the organized nature of street gangs, 
which together, are the chief source of terror created by street gangs.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.20; 
1988 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1256 (West) (“This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the 
‘California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act.’”). 
 37. Offenders in California who are convicted of violent offenses often serve consecutive 
sentences for crimes involving multiple victims, and the court does not need to explain on the record 
why consecutive sentences are being imposed. See, e.g., People v. Arviso, 247 Cal. Rptr. 559, 560–
61 (Ct. App. 1988). Moreover, weapon enhancements—as long as twenty-five years to life—until 
2018, had to be imposed consecutively and could not be struck by the trial judge. See CAL. PENAL 
CODE §§ 12022.5, 12022.53 (West 2019); see also, People v. Robbins, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 482 
(Ct. App. 2018) (acknowledging that, following the passage of California Senate Bill 620, judges 
have the discretion to strike weapon enhancements under Penal Code section 1385). These long 
sentences are a tremendous burden on both inmates and facilities. Thanks to excessively long 
sentences, the United States has more prisoners fifty-five years of age and older than ever before. 
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OLD BEHIND BARS: THE AGING PRISON POPULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 6 (2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usprisons0112webwcover_0.pdf 
(“[T]he number of sentenced federal and state prisoners who are age 65 or older grew an astonishing 
94 times faster than the total sentenced prisoner population between 2007 and 2010. The older 
prison population increased by 63 percent, while the total prison population grew by 0.7 percent 
during the same period.”). Inevitably, life sentences, especially life without parole sentences, make 
the problem worse; life sentences contemplate—if not guarantee—the likelihood that an offender 
will die of old age in prison. See id. at 33–36. 
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effective targets of these laws.38 Youth are far more likely to 
participate in street gangs, more likely to commit a crime in a group 
of youths and commit a crime against another group of youths, more 
likely to fire into or out of a motor vehicle, and more likely to be in a 
group in which one member is engaged in those activities. Youth are 
also more likely to have undiagnosed mental illness, autism spectrum 
disorder, ADHD, or PTSD, which might lead them to commit these 
acts.39 
An example of this tendency is the case of sixteen-year-old 
Rodrigo Caballero, who, by committing a crime, gave his name to the 
case, People v. Caballero.40 Caballero, also known by his moniker, 
“Dreamer,” was a member of the Vario Lancas street gang; his 
intended victims were members of the rival Val Verde Park street 
gang. On June 6, 2007, Caballero jumped out of a car on a street corner 
in Palmdale, California, and shouted “Lancas” at a group of five 
youths.41 One of the youths, Carlos Vargas, responded by shouting 
“Val Verde.”42 Caballero fired a gun at the group, hitting one of the 
youths, Adrian Bautista, in the back and shoulder.43 
Caballero admitted to an investigating officer that he had 
committed the shooting. At trial, he testified that he was “straight 
trying to kill somebody,” but then also said that he had fired at the 
group only to scare them.44 Caballero, who was diagnosed by two 
mental health professionals as suffering from “schizophrenia, 
paranoid type,” was found to be too delusional to assist his attorney.45 
After approximately six months of antipsychotic medication, 
Caballero was found competent to stand trial and was convicted of 
“three counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted 
murder, with findings that he personally and intentionally discharged 
 
 38. See, e.g., Sarah A. Kellogg, Note, Just Grow up Already: The Diminished Culpability of 
Juvenile Gang Members After Miller v. Alabama, 55 B.C. L. REV. 265, 281–82 (2014) (noting that 
California’s STEP Act disproportionately penalized juvenile offenders, and arguing that such an 
approach is categorically banned under Miller). 
 39. See generally Lee A. Underwood & Aryssa Washington, Mental Illness and Juvenile 
Offenders, 13 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 228 (2016). 
 40. 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012). 
 41. Id. at 293. 
 42. Id. 
 43. People v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 
2012). 
 44. Id. at 924. 
 45. Id. at 921. 
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a firearm, inflicted great bodily injury upon one victim, and committed 
the crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang.”46 
Caballero was sentenced as follows: fifteen years to life for each 
of three potential victims, including Adrian Bautista, to run 
consecutively.47 For each of the victims, he received a firearm 
enhancement: twenty-five years to life for possessing and personally 
discharging a firearm and causing great bodily injury to one of the 
victims.48 His aggregate sentence was 110 years to life, making him 
eligible for parole no earlier than his 126th birthday.49 
It is notable, in passing, that Caballero was in many ways a classic 
youthful offender. He was in a street gang.50 He was traveling with a 
group of other youths in a car.51 He jumped out of that car to shoot 
into another group of youths, who obliged him by identifying 
themselves as rival gang members.52 Finally, Caballero was floridly 
schizophrenic, unmedicated, and initially unable to help his attorney, 
yet he was found competent to stand trial, and his mental health had 
no effect on his sentence.53 The court of appeal affirmed his sentence, 
declaring that it was “not unconstitutional.”54 
The California Supreme Court, fresh on the heels of the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, instead turned 
to an earlier Supreme Court decision, People v. Graham, which 
categorically banned LWOP sentences for juveniles who committed 
“non-homicide crimes.”55 While Graham never said that functional 
LWOP was covered by its holding, the California Supreme Court, 
using language from Graham, declared that “a state must provide a 
juvenile offender ‘with some realistic opportunity to obtain release’ 
from prison during his or her expected lifetime.”56 Because Caballero 
 
 46. Id. at 920 (first citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.22(b)(1)(C), 187(a) (West 2014); then 
citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 664(a) (West 2010); and then citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.53(b)–
(d) (West 2012)). 
 47. Caballero, 282 P.3d at 293. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. People v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 920 (Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 
2012). 
 54. Id. at 924–27. 
 55. Caballero, 282 P.3d at 293. 
 56. Id. at 295 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010)). 
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did not receive this opportunity, the court’s remedy was that he, as 
well as all 
[d]efendants who were sentenced for crimes they committed 
as juveniles who seek to modify life without parole or 
equivalent de facto sentences already imposed[,] may file 
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court in order 
to allow the court to weigh the mitigating evidence in 
determining the extent of incarceration required before 
parole hearings.57 
Although Caballero’s holding was relatively narrow—it only 
applied to the perhaps 3,000 juvenile offenders who were serving 
functional LWOP—the effect of the decision was stark: every juvenile 
offender who met these criteria would be entitled to a resentencing 
hearing in a trial court.58 
Whether this development was a good thing depends on whom 
you asked. Defense attorneys immediately filed petitions for their 
clients and began to prepare for mitigation hearings. Judges and 
prosecutors may not have been so sanguine. Suddenly, instead of 
facing hearings for fewer than 300 juveniles serving LWOP, they were 
looking at hearings possibly stretching on for decades. 
Faced with the prospect of a re-reckoning with thousands of 
excessive juvenile sentences, the Los Angeles County District 
Attorney’s Office immediately sponsored a bill (Assembly Bill 1276) 
that would have offered all juvenile non-homicide offenders a parole 
hearing at twenty-five years of incarceration, regardless of the 
seriousness of the crime, mitigation evidence, or length of sentence—
a “parole fix.”59 Juvenile justice advocates, on the other hand, 
proposed an alternative bill (Senate Bill 260) that would have given 
every juvenile offender serving an adult prison sentence a 
resentencing hearing, excluding certain offenders, such as juveniles 
serving LWOP (already covered by Penal Code section 1170(d)(2) 
and Miller), or juveniles who were convicted of first degree murder 
with special circumstances.60 
 
 57. Id. at 295–96. 
 58. See id.  
 59. See ASSEMB. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 1276, 2013–
2014 Reg. Sess., at 5 (Cal. 2013–2014). 
 60. S. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL NO. 260, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., 
at 4 (Cal. 2013–2014). 
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How the legislature combined the two above bills to create the 
bill that ultimately became law—an amended version of Senate Bill 
260 that created the Youthful Offender Parole Hearing—is beyond the 
scope of this Article.61 But it is within the scope of this Article to 
observe that, from the very beginning, when faced with dealing with 
excessive juvenile sentences in county superior courts, prosecutors 
chose to hand the responsibility for these sentences back to the Board 
of Parole Hearings, and the state took on that responsibility.62 This 
handoff occurred because of the confluence of two forces, described 
below. 
DEFINING ACCOUNTABILITY UPWARD 
The first of these two forces is more accurately described as a 
tendency: the tendency of institutional actors to transfer difficult 
responsibilities to other institutional actors. By quite a wide margin, 
Los Angeles County has sentenced more juveniles to long sentences 
in adult prisons than any other county in California.63 If anyone was 
going to feel the pain of resentencing hearings for juvenile offenders, 
it would be Los Angeles County. John Pfaff, in his excellent book, 
Locked In, identifies a similar widespread tendency for counties to 
shift the burden of incarceration to states.64 Naturally, having already 
shifted that burden, Los Angeles County had no desire to take it up 
once again, in the form of resentencing hearings. Much better to let 
the state-controlled, state-funded Board of Parole Hearings wrestle 
with the problem. 
 
 61. S.B. No. 260, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013–2014). 
 62. As noted in several places in this Article, the California Supreme Court’s Franklin 
decision, like “Realignment,” may have been part of an effort by the state to shift responsibility 
back to the counties. 
 63. Data released by the California Department of Corrections in October 2016 calculated the 
number of incarcerated offenders eligible for Youthful Offender Parole Hearings. By this time, 
these hearings covered offenders up to the age of twenty-five. But the contrast is still startling. Los 
Angeles County had 11,808 eligible youthful offenders. The next largest population was from 
Riverside County, with 1,989 eligible youthful offenders. See Excel Document, Cal. Bd. of Parole 
Hearings, supra note 3. 
 64. See JOHN F. PFAFF, supra note 11. Pfaff notes that one of the causes of oversentencing, 
and the seeking of excessive sentences by prosecutors, is that the county, which imposes the 
excessive prison term, is relieved from the difficulty of paying for that prison term, because prisons 
are administered and funded by the state. Id. at 143. 
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BROWN V. PLATA 
And the state of California was already dealing with this very 
formidable problem, in the form of prison overcrowding.65 As the 
original Committee Report for Senate Bill 260 noted,  
For the last several years, severe overcrowding in 
California’s prisons has been the focus of evolving and 
expensive litigation relating to conditions of confinement. 
On May 23, 2011, the United States Supreme Court ordered 
California to reduce its prison population to 137.5 percent of 
design capacity within two years from the date of its ruling, 
subject to the right of the state to seek modifications in 
appropriate circumstances.66 
These anodyne, technical-sounding numbers in fact described a 
massive human rights crisis in California prisons. In 2011, California 
had a “design capacity” of 80,000 beds, with a prison population of 
156,000.67 Two lawsuits by California prisoners, demanding better 
medical and mental health care,68 morphed into the monumental 
prison rights case, Brown v. Plata.69 On May 23, 2011, the United 
States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision along partisan lines, ordered 
California to reduce the prison population to about 110,000 inmates: 
still very crowded and unhealthy, but less blatantly hellish.70 The 
deadline for this reduction was June 27, 2013, and at the time of Senate 
Bill 260’s introduction, Governor Brown was far behind schedule.71 
This, then, is the second force that created the Youthful Offender 
Parole Hearing—state-level political control. Resentencing hearings 
were time-consuming and costly and could not efficiently release even 
a fraction of the more than 20,000 youthful offenders in the California 
prison system. Seeing an opportunity to do justice and keep his prisons 
 
 65. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011). 
 66. S. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL NO. 260, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., 
at 4 (Cal. 2013–2014). 
 67. Plata, 563 U.S. at 501–02. 
 68. The original lawsuits were Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (filed 
in 1990, alleging inadequate mental health treatment for California prisoners), and Plata v. Davis, 
329 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003) (filed in 2001, alleging inadequate medical treatment for California 
prisoners). The findings and orders of the three-judge panel at issue in Brown v. Plata applied to 
both lawsuits. Plata, 563 U.S. at 500. 
 69. Id. at 493. 
 70. Id. at 541–45. 
 71. S. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL NO. 260, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., 
at 5 (Cal. 2013–2014). 
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away from federal control, Governor Brown signed Senate Bill 260, 
Senate Bill 261 and finally, Assembly Bill 1308, which made those 
inmates eligible for Youthful Offender Parole Hearings.72 
Senate Bill 260 renders juvenile offenders serving non-LWOP 
sentences eligible for a youthful offender parole hearing at their 
fifteenth, twentieth, or twenty-fifth year of incarceration, depending 
on the length of their controlling offense.73 Significantly, per 
California Penal Code section 4801(c), the legislature requires the 
Board of Parole Hearings to “give great weight to the diminished 
culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of 
youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the 
[offender].”74 Senate Bill 260 was intended to ensure eligible juvenile 
offenders will “have a meaningful opportunity to obtain release” when 
that offender has gained sufficient maturity.75 
PEOPLE V. FRANKLIN 
Following the passage of Senate Bill 260, the California Supreme 
Court handed down a two-part decision in People v. Franklin.76 First, 
the court held that the procedures created by Senate Bill 260, 
specifically the provisions that entitle an inmate to a youthful offender 
parole hearing, cured the constitutional error in sentencing by giving 
the petitioner the right to a parole hearing after serving twenty-five 
years of his sentence.77 Second, the court held that remand was 
 
 72.  Senate Bill 260, approved by the governor on September 16, 2013, provides early parole 
hearings for juvenile offenders whose commitment offenses occurred when they were under the 
age of 18. See S.B. No. 260, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013–2014). Senate Bill 261, approved 
by the governor on October 3, 2015, extends those hearings to youthful offenders whose 
commitment offenses occurred when they were under the age of 23. See S.B. No. 261, 2015–2016 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015–2016). Finally, Assembly Bill 1308, approved by the governor on October 
11, 2017, extended the above protections to youthful offenders “who committed those specified 
crimes when they were 25 years of age or younger.” See A.B. No. 1308, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2017–2018). 
 73. S.B. No. 260, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013–2014). Controlling offense means the 
offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment. 
A “controlling offense” does not refer to an offense, per se, but instead to a term of years, with or 
without a life term. Therefore, the longest component of an inmate’s sentence may be, and often is, 
a gang or weapon enhancement. 
 74. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (West Supp. 2019). 
 75. People v. Franklin, 370 P.3d 1053, 1060 (Cal. 2016). 
 76. Id. at 1053. 
 77. Id. at 1062; In re Cook, 441 P.3d 912, 913–14 (Cal. 2019). It is still not clear whether 
Franklin’s sentence was constitutional because he would have the opportunity to put mitigation 
evidence into the record, or whether his sentence was constitutional because of his future parole 
hearing, and the opportunity to put evidence into the record flowed solely from that statutory right. 
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required to determine whether the trial court afforded the youthful 
offender sufficient opportunity, pursuant to Miller and its progeny, to 
develop a record of mitigating evidence relevant to his eventual 
youthful offender parole hearing.78 Later, in People v. Rodriguez,79 the 
court clarified that, essentially, any sentencing hearing conducted 
before the passage of Senate Bill 260 was “not adequate in light of the 
purpose of [the youthful offender parole hearing law].”80 In other 
words, every youthful offender sentenced pre-2016 had to receive the 
benefits of Franklin. The question was, how? 
IN RE COOK AND THE REALITIES OF JUVENILE POST-CONVICTION LAW 
Initially, relief under Franklin was cognizable under the post-
conviction vehicle used by nearly every prisoner seeking freedom: by 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. However, as the state argued in 
Cook, Franklin was not intended to provide a remedy for an 
unconstitutional or illegal sentence, and therefore, habeas corpus was 
not the proper means to initiate a Franklin proceeding.81 Instead, it 
argued, Franklin was merely an “evidence-gathering procedure” 
meant only to aid the Board of Parole Hearings in deciding about a 
juvenile offender’s suitability for parole.82 Such a purpose did not 
deserve the majesty of “The Great Writ.”83 
That, coincidentally, is also the argument of the numerous 
defense attorneys who argue for the simplified, administrative version 
of “bundling.” “Bundling” (a neologism created by these authors) 
describes a common practice in Franklin “litigation.” The defense 
attorney chooses not to provide expert reports, social histories, and 
written pleadings to the court; decides not to present the experts and 
their findings in live testimony; and makes no oral argument on the 
 
The California Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that this issue is unresolved. Cook, 
441 P.3d at 922 (citing People v. Rodriguez, 417 P.3d 185, 190 (Cal. 2018)) (“Finally, as we have 
before, we express no view on whether a Franklin proceeding is constitutionally required.”) 
 78. Franklin, 370 P.3d at 1064–65. 
 79. 417 P.3d 185 (Cal. 2018). 
 80. Id. at 190; see also People v. Tran, 20 Cal. App. 5th 561, 570 (2018) (holding that a 
defendant sentenced before Franklin was decided was presumed to have received an inadequate 
opportunity to present mitigation evidence). 
 81. Cook argued, reasonably, that since an effective parole hearing was all that stood between 
him and freedom, the lack of a Franklin hearing affected the conditions of his confinement and was 
therefore a perfect subject for a habeas petition. See Answer Brief on the Merits at 10–11, In re 
Cook, 441 P.3d 912 (Cal. 2019) (No. S240153), 2017 WL 4001660. 
 82. See id. at 8–9. 
 83. See id. at 11–12. 
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client’s behalf. Instead, the “bundling” defense attorney gathers an 
undifferentiated mass of pre-trial records—probation reports, juvenile 
delinquency records, DCFS records, and letters of support—and 
submits them to the court with a brief motion, asking the court to 
submit the documents to the Board of Parole Hearings. It’s fast, it’s 
inexpensive, and it avoids any confrontation with the prosecution over 
the moral character of the client.84 
 
 84. The Second District Court of Appeal recently sanctioned this approach in a published 
opinion, People v. Sepulveda, No. B289160, 2020 WL 1545789 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2020). Travis 
Sepulveda, a defendant sentenced for three attempted murders he committed at age eighteen, and a 
murder he committed at age twenty-one, claimed that he had a constitutional right to a live Franklin 
hearing, rather than the detailed and comprehensive mitigation memorandum his attorney 
submitted to the trial court, out of the presence of both Sepulveda and the prosecutor. Id. at *1. The 
court held that: (1) the defendant had no right to a live hearing at sentencing; and (2) there is no 
constitutional due process right to a Franklin proceeding; all rights flow from the statutory right 
created by the legislature. Id. However, nothing this Article says about live hearings as a best 
practice is affected by the ruling in Sepulveda. For example, one benefit of a live hearing would 
have been that the judge would have had to state on the record why or why not Sepulveda’s 
mitigation evidence affected his sentencing decision. However, the Sepulveda court categorically 
dismissed this imputed purpose, stating instead that “[t]he purpose of providing an opportunity to 
present youth-related factors mitigating culpability is not to influence the trial court’s discretionary 
sentencing decisions but to preserve information relevant to the defendant’s eventual youth 
offender parole hearing.” Id. at *5. 
  This statement is frankly misplaced, applying the post-conviction holdings of Cook and 
Rodriguez to the issue of mitigation evidence at sentencing. Taking the court’s reasoning to its 
logical conclusion, trial courts are still free to oversentence youth offenders, just as they did thirty 
years ago, secure in the knowledge that Franklin evidence—introduced only after sentencing—
will influence the parole board, but not trouble the sentencing court itself. This is a troubling 
conclusion. Nothing in the Franklin opinion suggested that its holding was confined to post-
conviction litigation. In fact, the issue in Cook was whether Franklin applied at all in post-
conviction. Cook, 441 P.3d at 917. It seems strange that the California Supreme Court would create 
a special proceeding, designed to remedy the lack of mitigation evidence at a juvenile offender’s 
original sentencing, and then also hold that this new, remedial hearing, going forward, would have 
no effect on a judge’s sentencing decisions. 
  Sepulveda was convicted of three counts of attempted murder, and one count of first-
degree murder he committed when he was eighteen and twenty-one years old, respectively. Id. at 
*1. He was sentenced to an aggregate indeterminate prison term of ninety years to life. Id. During 
sentencing proceedings, Sepulveda’s attorney stipulated to a written Franklin mitigation evidence 
submission and declined to present any live testimony. Id. at *1–2. The Franklin evidence, a 
mitigation report authored by an appointed capital mitigation investigation expert, psychological 
and educational assessments, school records, and interviews with Sepulveda’s family, would be 
submitted to the court “about three weeks or a month” after Sepulveda’s sentencing. Id. at *2–3. 
The court proceeded with Sepulveda’s sentencing without consideration of any Franklin evidence. 
See id. at *3. 
  Sepulveda appealed, seeking remand for a Franklin hearing. Id. at *1. He argued, 
“Franklin is, in essence, an aspect of the sentencing hearing and, as such, directly implicates a 
defendant’s fundamental due process rights, including to be present at the hearing, to present a 
defense and to cross-examine witnesses—rights that cannot be waived by counsel without the 
client’s consent.” Id. at *5. The Second District held the opposite—that the rights Franklin affords 
defendants are statutory in nature and do not implicate a defendant’s constitutional rights, at all. Id. 
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Many defense attorneys and public defender offices favor this 
method of presenting mitigation evidence.85 There’s no point in doing 
more, they argue. Doing a full-blown hearing is ruinously expensive 
for already cash-strapped public defender offices—it takes valuable 
time away from zealously representing defendants at the trial level, 
and it annoys judges. Finally, what if the People finally notice what’s 
going on and start cross-examining our experts or presenting their own 
reports? Our psychologists’ opinions about causative factors are just 
speculation, paper-thin supposition that will never withstand the 
brilliance of line deputies and their rapier-like trial skills. Better to 
quietly submit the documents and bypass the hearing process. Why do 
more? 
None of these vital issues of attorney competence and diligence 
are discussed in Cook, and nor should they be. The California Supreme 
Court is not the place to define what an advocate ought to do in a trial-
level court. On the other hand, trial-level attorneys also have no 
business arguing that the California Supreme Court took away rights 
from a defendant seeking Franklin relief. Yet pleadings have already 
been filed in California courts by prosecution offices, arguing that the 
California Supreme Court has severely curtailed the rights of Franklin 
movants, despite the fact that none of that prosecution-friendly 
language finds support in the Cook opinion. 
On the other hand, Cook does not provide much support for 
diligent defense attorneys, either. True to its practice, the court seems 
content to leave much of the detail work to the superior court. 
Attorneys on both sides will have to thrash out those details, and much 
 
The court further held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in accepting defense 
counsel’s stipulation to a written Franklin submission. Id. 
  The California Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the lack of a Franklin proceeding 
violates due process. Moreover, Sepulveda does not vacate Medrano or Carranza, where other 
appellate courts declared that an insufficient Franklin hearing at sentencing could be cured by a 
1203.01 motion post-conviction. See People v. Medrano, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 (Ct. App. 2019); 
People v. Carranza, No. A152211, 2019 WL 5867435 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2019). 
  The court also ruled that, if Sepulveda wanted to argue ineffective assistance of counsel 
by his attorney for failing to demand a live hearing, he could file a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
(though the court helpfully suggested several strategic reasons why the attorney wouldn’t want a 
live hearing). Id. at *6. 
 85. In San Bernardino County, where In re Cook originated, live hearings are discouraged. 
The process is designed to be streamlined, with as much documentation as possible submitted with 
the original motion. See Directive, Superior Court of Cal., Cty. of San Bernardino, Procedures for 
Franklin Proceedings (June 5, 2019) (on file with authors). 
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of that thrashing will take place at a local level, where custom and 
judicial habit are almost as important as black letter law. 
But let’s for a moment take the side of the bundlers, and ask the 
obvious question: “who cares?” Is it necessary to employ experts, 
solicit reports, and engage with the court and the prosecutor? Does the 
client need it? Does the Board of Parole Hearings need it? Does the 
court need it? Why all this pointless theater? 
The answer is this: there’s more at stake in a Franklin hearing 
than the proper transmission of mitigation evidence to the Board of 
Parole Hearings. Those stakes are not immediately apparent from the 
Franklin opinion, and they are certainly not mentioned in Cook, but 
the remedy in Franklin implicitly addresses them. These stakes can be 
summarized as a triad of institutional realities that will be familiar to 
any attorney who practices in California. 
First, there is the fact that California trial court judges have 
historically heard very little mitigation evidence during the sentencing 
phase of a trial. Why would they? Judges had very little discretion 
under the sentencing laws of the 1990s, though they had more 
discretion than many judges were willing to admit.86 After a 
conviction on a serious or violent felony, a judge’s only option in 
many cases was to stack gang and gun enhancements, along with 
determinate sentences, on top of an already long sentence or series of 
sentences. As noted above, functional life without parole—that is, a 
sentence of fifty years to life or longer—was all too common, even as 
crime rates plummeted. Most of the judges sitting on superior court 
benches were ex-prosecutors themselves, and they knew how much 
power was in the hands of felony trial deputies. 
Second, trial defense attorneys have historically agreed with those 
judges. For judges to hear mitigation evidence, defense attorneys must 
gather and present it. As sentencing laws became more and more 
draconian, and prosecutors acquired almost unlimited plea-bargaining 
power, defense attorneys began to despair. Many behaved as if their 
jobs were finished when the verdict was announced. They were 
 
 86. See Jon’a Meyer & Paul Jesilow, The Formation of Judicial Bias in Sentencing: 
Preliminary Findings on “Doing Justice”, 22 W. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 279 (1995) (noting that after 
the 1976 implementation of determinate sentencing laws in California, judicial discretion at 
sentencing was so limited that California judges admitted to using “a variety of methods to expand 
their discretion, including refusing plea bargains, assignment of offenders to probation and 
community service, creative interpretation of statutes, and recommendations to the probation 
department to allow alternative placements for mandatory sentences”). 
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supported in this belief by the other institutional actors. These authors 
have read too many appellate records where the only sentencing 
papers were filed by the prosecution, and the defense had almost 
nothing to say on the defendant’s behalf. 
Finally, Franklin addresses another reality of youthful offender 
parole hearings: it is highly unlikely that appointed parole counsel will 
gather mitigation evidence. They are incapable of it, both 
institutionally and financially. Social histories, psychological reports, 
prison adjustment reports, and institutional evidence in the form of 
educational records, DCFS records, and foster care reports are beyond 
the scope of the appointment, and the state is not offering any help, 
financial or otherwise. 
In more detail, the next Part covers these three institutional 
limitations, and how the Franklin proceeding can ameliorate them. 
ATTITUDES TOWARD FRANKLIN 
Perhaps it would help to return to our original question: do post-
conviction Franklin hearings matter at all? The word “hearings” is 
used advisedly, because the question is really two questions: does 
Franklin matter, and do hearings matter? 
An easy answer to the first question is: if the Franklin proceeding 
didn’t matter, the California Supreme Court would not have created it, 
and would not have chosen trial courts as the venue for these 
mitigation hearings. Franklin clearly states that its antecedents are not 
the regulations or decisions of the California Department of 
Corrections, but the California legislature and the courts of review, 
including the United States Supreme Court.87 The California Supreme 
Court did not direct parole attorneys to gather evidence and present it 
to the Board of Parole Hearings; it directed trial attorneys to present 
evidence to trial courts.88 That makes sense: mitigation evidence is 
generally presented in the trial court; mitigation evidence should have 
been presented in the trial court. So, by creating the Franklin 
proceeding, the California Supreme Court is, in effect, saying: you 
broke it, you fix it, and the Board of Parole Hearings can reap the 
benefits of the additional evidence. 
 
 87. People v. Franklin, 370 P.3d 1053, 1060 (Cal. 2016). 
 88. See In re Cook, 441 P.3d 912, 922 (Cal. 2019). 
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It is therefore understandable that prosecutors would bridle at the 
thought of being forced to dig up old transcripts, justify earlier 
sentencing decisions, and generally endure the wholesale 
humanization of juvenile offenders who had previously been 
sentenced as if they were monsters. It is also understandable that 
judges, their dockets already strained by court consolidation, would 
not want to waste precious time on a hearing where they don’t even 
get to make a ruling. 
What is less understandable was the defense bar’s lack of passion 
for rethinking or rearguing juvenile justice. A Franklin proceeding, 
properly litigated, is a way to explore the connection between social 
forces, psychological factors, and juvenile culpability, and to do it in 
full view of the institutional actors who make decisions based on 
juvenile culpability: judges, prosecutors, commissioners, probation 
officers, and defense attorneys. The hearings, though they will not 
change a single sentence, might shed some light on the legal and 
cultural forces behind the thirty-year effort to lock up thousands of 
youths in California prisons. 
But a large part of the defense bar, perhaps beaten down by years 
of powerlessness in the face of absolute prosecutorial discretion, 
seems to have little appetite for restarting the conversation about 
juvenile sentencing. These authors have heard it frequently in Los 
Angeles trial courts: “Franklin? That useless remedy?” said one parole 
attorney. “Much ado about nothing,” scoffed a defense attorney in a 
branch court, who was, in fact, handling several Franklin proceedings. 
“I can present any facts I want to at a parole hearing, without worrying 
about the Rules of Evidence. What do I need a court proceeding for?” 
asked another post-conviction attorney. 
But if recent history has taught us anything, it is that democratic 
norms matter, and that much of what we call “the law” is in fact a 
cluster of entrenched customs that change, not only as the result of 
legislation or appellate law, but also in response to repetitive practice 
at the local level. This repetitive practice is often defined as “judicial 
discretion” or “prosecutorial discretion,” with that term’s aroma of 
well-deserved power. But really, repetitive practice is less a matter of 
absolute power than a cluster of unspoken beliefs, held in common by 
institutional actors. In other words, the decisions that prosecutors, 
judges, and defense attorneys make in day-to-day practice, and the 
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reasons for those decisions, matter as much as the laws that give them 
the latitude to make those decisions in the first place.89 
This, in fact, ought to be the promise of Franklin: that it can 
change the assumptions that provide the foundation for repetitive 
decision-making in court practice. This promise is partly the necessary 
result of having no recourse to any other promises. Franklin changes 
no sentences, releases no inmates from prison, requires no 
explanations from prosecutors, and requires no judge to justify an 
earlier sentencing decision. If none of these more concrete goals are 
available, then the Franklin proceeding must take refuge in the less 
tangible goals of changing the conversation about juvenile offender 
culpability. On the other hand, it is also arguable that, without a change 
in this conversation, all the statutes, regulations, and appellate 
opinions will be insubstantial, impermanent gestures. Not only will 
there be little change in the criminal courts, the little change that does 
occur will fade away with the first uptick in the crime rate. So, the 
answer to both questions is yes. Franklin matters, because it changes 
the conversation about youth crime, and hearings matter, because it’s 
not a conversation if one institutional actor submits documents and the 
other actors silently accept them. 
Others would argue that Franklin’s promise is, in fact, not 
intangible but concrete. Specifically, the proceeding is concretely 
aimed at the Board of Parole Hearings because Franklin promises a 
proceeding to supplement the record that exists solely for the its use. 
In fact, Franklin states this clearly: 
The goal of any such proceeding is to provide an opportunity 
for the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile 
offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of 
the offense so that the Board, years later, may properly 
discharge its obligation to “give great weight to” youth-
related factors . . . in determining whether the offender is “fit 
 
 89. Professor John F. Pfaff argues that the discretion of a single institutional actor—the county 
prosecutor—is primarily responsible for oversentencing, so perhaps some customs are more 
entrenched than others. See, e.g., PFAFF, supra note 11, at 70 (“What we call the criminal justice 
system is, in practice, a mishmash of independent, often competitive bureaucracies, all attentive to 
different constituencies . . . . In fact, when we break the criminal justice ‘system’ into its constituent 
parts, a striking fact stands out . . . prosecutors have been the ones who are most responsible for 
overall prison growth.”). 
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to rejoin society” despite having committed a serious crime 
“while he was a child in the eyes of the law.”90 
Going with this view of Franklin, it makes sense not to simply 
“bundle” documents but also to avoid live hearings, since the intended 
target of Franklin is not courts, but the Board of Parole Hearings. It is 
true, the Board of Parole Hearings is the ultimate destination for 
Franklin evidence, and the most tangible result—namely, parole—
will be felt there. 
The authors of this Article come down squarely on one side of 
this debate: we believe that, to be effective, a Franklin proceeding 
must include three components: first, mitigation evidence that is 
summarized and curated, preferably in expert reports that analyze the 
client’s history, commitment offense, and potential for rehabilitation; 
second, a comprehensive mitigation memorandum that distills the 
mitigation evidence in an analytical structure based on the five factors 
enumerated in Miller; and third, a live hearing, where the experts can 
explain their opinions, deal with cross-examination, and answer any 
questions the court may have. Anything less will offer incomplete 
Franklin relief. To buttress this argument, here, in more detail, are the 
three institutional realities that make Franklin hearings necessary. 
JUDICIAL CONTEXTUALIZATION 
In Franklin, at issue are not only the rights of youthful offenders 
facing parole hearings, but also the rights of the youthful offenders of 
the future, sitting in the courtrooms of judges who sentenced their 
fathers, older brothers, and uncles to long sentences. Many of the 
judges who sentenced juvenile offenders to long sentences are still on 
the bench, and the judges who came after them are often former felony 
prosecutors who argued for those original sentences. Over the last 
thirty years, these judges and prosecutors have been the most 
important institutional actors in the overincarceration of youth. In 
thousands of cases, prosecutors have argued that children who commit 
crimes are irredeemable. They have pointed at juvenile defendants and 
described them as “monsters,” “dead inside,” “completely without 
moral understanding,” and “deserving of the death penalty.” Judges 
have echoed those arguments in their pronouncement of sentences, 
 
 90. Franklin, 370 P.3d at 1065 (citations omitted) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 
79 (2010)). 
(7) 53.2_HAWTHORNE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/2/2020  5:02 PM 
400 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:373 
often invoking “the will of the people” or the fact that “the legislature 
has spoken.” Although judges and prosecutors must acknowledge 
changes in the law, it takes years—sometimes decades—to change 
judicial and prosecutorial habits. The only way to change those habits 
is to counter thirty years of repetitive oversentencing with an equal 
number of years of repetitive evidence of the humanity and 
redeemability of juvenile offenders. 
Thirty years of mitigation hearings: that sounds crazy. But, as we 
gradually awaken from California’s nightmare of mass incarceration, 
it is helpful to remember that the nightmare did not happen overnight. 
Rather, it was the result of the repeated condemnation of youth in the 
news, in politics, in schools, on television, and in the courts.91 After 
thirty years of that barrage, how can any judge believe—really believe, 
with her own senses—that youthful offenders are redeemable, without 
repeatedly seeing the evidence of that in their courtrooms? In the 
opinion of these authors, judges need to see the redeemability of 
juvenile offenders in the flesh. And not just once, but dozens, even 
hundreds of times. Otherwise, what judge would believe that the 
“irreparably corrupt” juvenile offender was, in the words of Miller, 
“rare”?92 Why would she not believe that the true rarity was the 
juvenile offender whose crime reflected “transient immaturity”? Why 
would the judge not believe that the few rehabilitated offenders she 
saw in her courtroom were just exceptions, and that overall, she had 
made the right decision in 99 percent of her cases? 
Based on their past decisions, statements, and asides to court 
counsel, trial judges are not going to see redemption in the sullen, 
angry, seventeen-year-old defendant, sitting through a long felony 
trial, twiddling his thumbs and staring at the ceiling. In order to do 
that, those judges would have to extend their understanding of the 
juvenile offender, into the past and into the future. They would have 
to see the totality of this distracted, affectless creature. What did his 
home life look like? How much violence did he experience daily? Did 
he have any cognitive limitations or mental illness, not enough to 
 
 91. See, e.g., The Super-Predator Scare, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1h505w1 
(detailing the misguided statistical analysis and moral panic that gave rise to the “super-predator” 
scare of the 1990s). Some experts argue that the super-predator myth is making a comeback, with 
constitutionally suspect gang suppression initiatives. Alex Vitale, The New ‘Superpredator’ Myth, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/opinion/superpredator-
myth.html. 
 92. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012). 
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render him incompetent, but enough to damage his choosing 
mechanism? What was this youthful defendant like when he wasn’t 
experiencing the daily chaos of the streets? And finally, what might 
happen to this person in twenty years? Would the defendant mature, 
calm down, and become thoughtful, insightful, and self-aware? Or 
would he still be acting like an adolescent: impetuous, angry, and 
immature? Did he have a future, and could the court help guarantee 
that future by validating his humanity and his worth? 
THE LIMITED HORIZON OF PAROLE HEARINGS 
There is also a practical dimension to a Franklin hearing, and it 
bears on the realities of the parole process in California prisons—
realities that the Franklin court seemed to implicitly acknowledge. 
First, parole attorneys—particularly those who are paid by the 
state—have no time, money, or energy to conduct independent 
mitigation investigation. They have their hands full just dealing with 
their client’s prison records and the upcoming hearing. They also have 
little time to read a thick sheaf of pre-trial documents without even an 
executive summary to give them guidance. Finally, they are 
shockingly underpaid: rarely more than $400 per client, regardless of 
the complexity of the case.93 Most juvenile offenders seeking parole 
will be represented by appointed parole attorneys. 
Second, the realities faced by appointed parole attorneys apply 
doubly to parole commissioners. Parole hearing officers—both 
commissioners and the deputy commissioners who work with them—
conduct up to twenty hearings a week, followed by parole 
consultations, all at the same prison. Their days begin early in the 
morning, and frequently end well after nightfall. Lifer parole hearings 
take anywhere from one to five hours, depending on their complexity. 
For each hearing, a parole commissioner must read thousands of pages 
of prison records, as well as a Comprehensive Risk Assessment, any 
submissions by the potential parolee, and the transcripts from every 
prior parole hearing. The last thing a parole commissioner needs is a 
 
 93. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., Attorney Invoicing, 
https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/bph/attorney-overview/invoicing/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2020) (detailing a 
“menu” of attorney tasks, with assigned dollar amounts). In 2020, for the first time, California 
parole panel attorneys will get a raise, to a flat rate of $750 per client, irrespective of case 
complexity—enough to do a competent job at a hearing, but not remotely enough to do independent 
mitigation investigation. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., Application Process for New 
Attorneys, https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/bph/attorney-overview/application/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).  
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mass of undigested documents, many of which may be duplicated in 
the existing file. And yet, that appears to be the strategy employed by 
many public defender offices. 
The bottom line is, the Franklin proceeding bears a heavy historic 
burden. With no other remedy on the horizon, it is perilous to act like 
we can short-change this one. And yet—with that blithe amnesia so 
characteristic of California—that’s exactly what we are doing. 
 It doesn’t have to be that way. Defense counsel have the energy, 
and the courts have the resources, to do Franklin proceedings in a way 
that meaningfully honors the rights of juvenile offenders. Here’s how: 
HOW TO DO A FRANKLIN HEARING 
The best practices for representing a youthful offender in a 
Franklin proceeding are not particularly complex, nor should they be 
unfamiliar. They are the same best practices that a competent attorney 
would employ for a juvenile sentenced to life without the possibility 
of parole, pursuant to Miller. After all, what Tyris Lamar Franklin was 
seeking was not a Franklin hearing, but a Miller hearing. The 
difference—the only difference—is that a Franklin hearing lacks a 
judicial ruling. Attorneys argue; objections are made, overruled, and 
sustained; witnesses testify under oath; and pleadings are exchanged. 
That the judge is essentially a disinterested referee should not cause a 
great deal of consternation. Judges are often required to be 
institutionally passive. 
The first thing an attorney must do to initiate a Franklin 
proceeding is file a motion94 under the original caption and case 
number, in the original sentencing court.95 The motion should set forth 
the eligibility requirements for a Franklin proceeding: (1) that the 
client was under twenty-six at the time of the commitment offense; (2) 
that the client is entitled to a Youthful Offender Parole Hearing under 
California Penal Code sections 3051 and 4801 and an indication when 
that hearing is scheduled to take place; and (3) that the trial court did 
not consider youth-related mitigation evidence at the sentencing 
hearing.96 Although the proper vehicle for a Franklin proceeding after 
 
 94. Following Cook, this document is termed a “motion” pursuant to California Penal Code 
section 1203.01, but it contains the same allegations and arguments as a Franklin petition. 
 95. In re Cook, 441 P.3d 912, 922 (Cal. 2019). 
 96. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (West Supp. 2019). Following Rodriguez and Tran, any 
sentencing hearing that took place before Franklin was decided on May 26, 2016, is presumptively 
inadequate. Supra note 80. 
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Cook is a motion instead of a petition, the procedure after filing the 
motion remains the same. Just as in pre-Cook and pre-Franklin 
proceedings, the district attorney may oppose the motion if it believes 
the client has already had an opportunity to make a record of youth-
related mitigating evidence at the time of sentencing, and the court 
may exercise its discretion in how it wants to conduct the proceeding. 
However, if the client meets the eligibility criteria listed above, he is 
entitled to this proceeding,97 and any objections or challenges to the 
client’s right to a Franklin proceeding should be relatively easy to 
overcome. 
Preparation for the Franklin proceeding begins with thorough 
record collection. Attorneys should collect documentation from the 
client’s youth and post-conviction.98 In order to eventually synthesize 
youth-related mitigation evidence into a cohesive narrative, an 
attorney needs a clear picture of the circumstances surrounding his or 
her client throughout the client’s entire life. The records sought should 
comprise, but are not limited to the following: the full record on 
appeal, including reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts from the original 
trial and any appellate or habeas corpus filings; the original probation 
report; education records, particularly special education records; 
dependency and delinquency records, which may include records from 
the Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS); medical 
 
 97. In re Cook, 441 P.3d at 917. 
 98. Some district attorneys argue that the goal of the Franklin remedy is to create a “time 
capsule,” and the proceeding should only allow presentation of evidence from the time that the 
client committed his crime. They argue that any post-conviction evidence is irrelevant to the 
proceeding. 
  It is true that, following Cook, the court in a Franklin hearing may “exercise its discretion 
to conduct [the proceeding] efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, 
noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.” In re 
Cook, 441 P.3d at 922 (quoting People v. Rodriguez, 417 P.3d 185, 190 (Cal. 2018)). However, the 
fact that a court has the discretion to not consider certain evidence is not an adequate reason not to 
present the evidence in the first place. 
  The only difference between the Miller remedy Tyris Lamar Franklin sought and the 
remedy the court created in the Franklin proceeding is that there is no judicial sentencing decision. 
The Franklin proceeding contemplates the same five Miller factors, including the fifth factor—
which allows the client to present all relevant evidence bearing on the distinctive attributes of youth, 
including post-conviction efforts at rehabilitation. Moreover, under Franklin, the client must be 
given an opportunity to make a record of evidence relevant to the Board of Parole Hearings at his 
eventual youthful offender parole hearing. People v. Franklin, 370 P.3d 1053, 1064 (Cal. 2016) 
(“[I]n order to provide such a meaningful opportunity, the Board “shall give great weight to the 
diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any 
subsequent growth and increased maturity.”). Thus, post-conviction evidence of rehabilitation is 
not only relevant, but is essential to the mitigation presentation at a Franklin proceeding. 
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records; and finally, the client’s Central file (“C-File”) from the 
institution at which she is currently housed. 
Depending on the client’s age, some of these records may have 
been lost, destroyed, or be difficult to locate. However, it is imperative 
that the attorney seek out as many records as possible because they 
will ultimately inform the attorney’s decisions about what kinds of 
experts are the best equipped to evaluate and testify on behalf of the 
client. For example, an attorney who finds through medical records 
that his cognitively impaired client sustained a severe head injury as a 
child might seek out an expert who specializes in traumatic brain 
injury to best evaluate that client. Or, for a client who has had no 
apparent cognitive impairment or mental health concerns, but who 
endured severe childhood trauma, an attorney may seek out a licensed 
clinical social worker or social historian to best evaluate the client. 
The attorney should carefully read the records she is able to obtain, 
and glean from them significant themes, patterns, or events in the 
client’s life. 
The foundation for a fruitful Franklin proceeding is a 
comprehensive psycho-social life history, often referred to as a “social 
history.” The social history can be written by a social worker, attorney, 
investigator, anthropologist, psychologist, academic, or law student, 
and should present an in-depth study of the client’s life. To generate a 
high-quality social history, the author must do an exhaustive review 
of the available records, interview the client in person, and interview 
the client’s family and friends, again in person.99 The social history 
should ultimately contain information that is relevant to the factors 
present during the client’s childhood and the client’s subsequent 
growth and maturity.100 It can be organized topically or 
chronologically, can include images or visual representations of data, 
and should highlight significant events in the client’s life. Depending 
on who is best suited to write the social history, an attorney may seek 
 
 99. The authors have heard anecdotal reports of social historians substituting questionnaires 
for in-person interviews with clients or family members. Needless to say, this deprives the social 
historian of valuable information—demeanor and affect, not to mention effective follow-up 
questions—that she would gather during an in-person interview.   
 100. The social history, like many of the components of a Franklin proceeding, grows out of 
death penalty litigation. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533–36 (2003) (counsel’s failure to 
investigate and complete a competent social history for a defendant facing the death penalty was 
ineffective assistance of counsel). 
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appointment through the court, hire an independent social historian, or 
use an in-house specialist. 
After the social history is complete, based on its content, the 
attorney may choose to seek appointment of an additional expert. 
There are various reasons the attorney may choose this path. First, and 
most commonly, the person generally appointed to write the social 
history is not credentialed to make diagnoses—there are some 
diagnoses only medical doctors can make. For example, if there are 
indications that the client has struggled with mental illness or 
cognitive impairment, it may be beneficial for a doctor to do a targeted 
clinical evaluation of the client and make a diagnosis. There are other 
types of experts that may be advantageous in a Franklin proceeding, 
like gang experts and prison adjustment experts. However, attorneys 
should be strategic and thoughtful about the court’s stated or apparent 
willingness to appoint multiple experts. 
Once all reports and evaluations are complete, the attorney should 
meet with her expert to discuss the report’s findings and conclusions 
and prepare for in-court testimony. The court may allow multiple 
experts to testify, but in the case that it will only provide funds for one 
expert to appear in court, attorneys should choose the expert whose 
testimony will be most advantageous to the client at his youthful 
offender parole hearing.101 
After meeting with the expert and reviewing all the finalized 
reports, the attorney should file a statement in mitigation in advance 
of the actual Franklin proceeding. Like a sentencing memorandum in 
a Miller hearing, the statement in mitigation should contextualize the 
evidence in terms of the five Miller factors.102 Although there is no 
sentencing decision in a Franklin proceeding, the goal is to clarify for 
the court and, eventually, the Board of Parole Hearings, how the 
client’s youth affected his participation in the crime and how he has 
grown and rehabilitated since his conviction. The statement in 
 
 101. In some cases, the court may deny the request to appoint an expert entirely. This denial is 
erroneous and would result in a constitutionally defective Franklin hearing and a Fourteenth 
Amendment due process violation. As the court held in Doe v. Superior Court, indigent defendants 
have a constitutional right to retain a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate 
examination and assist in the “evaluation, preparation, and presentation” of the defense. 45 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 888, 892 (Ct. App. 1995). An attorney should be ready to litigate this matter but should 
also be cognizant of her client’s appetite for lengthy appellate litigation. 
 102. Some attorneys prefer to use the three factors listed in California Penal Code sections 3051 
and 4801, but because Franklin is a judicial remedy, there is something to be said for the five 
judicial factors developed in Miller and Gutierrez. 
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mitigation should attach as exhibits the social history, the expert 
report, and any underlying documentation used to support it. This 
filing should be submitted to the district attorney and the court at least 
two weeks before the hearing to give the district attorney a chance to 
respond, if he or she is inclined to do so. It will also give the court time 
to digest the information contained in the reports. 
The next strategic decision the attorney and client must make is 
to determine whether the client wishes to be present at the Franklin 
proceeding, or whether he chooses to waive his appearance. This 
decision can be quite difficult for clients who have invested a great 
deal of time and energy in creating a routine in state prison. 
Transportation to the county jail for court might result in the client 
losing his place in a specific self-help class or vocation. It may mean 
he will spend weeks in a crowded, more chaotic environment, 
surrounded by strangers, and potentially in danger. 
There are, however, potential benefits for the client if he chooses 
to appear in court. First, the court is likely to allow the client to 
allocute, or to make a statement of remorse, from the defense table. If 
a client can make a record of remorse at his or her Franklin 
proceeding, the Board of Parole Hearings will be able to see early 
evidence of remorse and insight.103 Additionally, because of the 
remote location of many of California’s state prisons, it is likely that 
the county jail facility is closer to family and friends and would allow 
the client to see his loved ones more often. 
Most significantly, a client who is present for his Franklin 
proceeding can see and hear, for the first time, the complete narrative 
that should have been developed at the time of his sentencing. At the 
time the client was sentenced, the only narrative presented in the 
courtroom was the story of the crime. Trial courts relied heavily on 
probation reports as evidence of criminal sophistication, gang 
membership, and antisocial behavior, and heard testimony from law 
enforcement, witnesses, and victims. Clients received exceptionally 
long sentences and were never given an opportunity to contextualize 
their involvement in the crime. Being present at the hearing can boost 
the client’s self-esteem, impart a sense of dignity, and encourage the 
client to continue on a rehabilitative path until his parole hearing. 
 
 103. In addition to the youth factors that the Board of Parole Hearings must consider, two of 
the primary measures of future dangerousness are whether the client possesses insight into the crime 
and remorse for his or her actions. In re Shaputis, 190 P.3d 573, 585 n.18 (Cal. 2008). 
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At the Franklin proceeding, an attorney may request that the court 
allow her to make a brief opening statement to frame the proceeding. 
The court will then hear the live witness testimony, and the district 
attorney may cross-examine the witness or witnesses. The attorney 
may request that she be able to make a brief closing argument and then 
she should request that the court transmit the transcript from the 
proceeding and the written submissions to the California Department 
of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The Franklin materials should be 
placed in the client’s C-file, so the Board of Parole Hearings has access 
to it at the time of the client’s youthful offender parole hearing. The 
court should also order that the client be removed back to state prison 
as quickly as possible. 
CONCLUSION 
After In re Cook, very little has changed legally. Defendants still 
have the right to conduct an “evidence preservation procedure,” and 
although habeas corpus is no longer the entry point for that procedure, 
the nature of the evidence “preserved” is the same.104 The court 
liberally quoted its earlier decisions in Franklin and Rodriguez, and 
still permits the possibility of actual hearings.105 Whatever any 
interested party may have hoped or feared, the demise of the House of 
Franklin has been greatly exaggerated. Aside from a new door and 
some new signage, the interior is basically unchanged. 
Or perhaps the right word is “unrenovated.” Because, despite 
having opportunities to do so, the court did nothing to strengthen the 
effectiveness of Franklin hearings or better define what procedures 
and documents would satisfy the dictates of Miller and its progeny. 
Reports? Testimony? A personal statement from the defendant? An 
on-the-record finding that the client is or is not permanently 
incorrigible? The court did note that a defendant who found the 
process inadequate could file a petition for writ of habeas corpus but 
gave no guidance as to what might be adequate.106 The court gave the 
power to judges to “conduct this process efficiently” and to exclude 
evidence if it does not “meaningfully add[] to the already available 
record.”107 Judges may also decide “whether testimony is 
 
 104. See generally In re Cook, 441 P.3d 912 (Cal. 2019). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 914. 
 107. Id. at 922. 
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‘appropriate’ or if other types of evidentiary submissions will 
suffice.”108  
What this means is that the House of Franklin is a real do-it-
yourself project. The renovation skills of each defense attorney will 
come into play, and there will be no waiting for the legislature or the 
California Supreme Court to come in with a wrecking ball. If defense 
counsel doesn’t like the popcorn ceiling of “documents only” 
submissions, that ceiling can and should be demolished. For the 
diligent attorney, the reward will be a well worth it: a hitherto 
concealed, spacious, and ornate second story of genuine mitigation 
evidence. All the successful Franklin attorney needs are commitment, 
training, and elbow grease.   
Without those three things, however, the Franklin attorney will 
soon find out that the house—so promising at the entrance—is 
cramped, inadequate, and shabby with a nice, low ceiling, but no floor 
to slow down the headlong race to the basement. 
 
 108. Id. 
